UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

THE ESTATE OF YARON UNGAR, AND OTHERS

C.A. NO. 00-105L

VS.

PROVIDENCE, R.I. JUNE 7, 2002

THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY AND THE PALESTINIAN LIBERATION ORGANIZATION

BEFORE SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE RONALD R.LAGUEUX

APPEARANCES:

FOR THE PLAINTIFFS:

DAVID J. STRACHMAN, ESQ 32 SOUTH MAIN STREET

SUITE 400

PROVIDENCE, R.I. 02903

351-7700

FOR THE DEFENDANTS:

LAWRENCE W, SCHILLING, ESQ.

36 EAST 12TH STREET

NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10003

212-475-3232

DEMING E. SHERMAN, ESQ.

EDWARDS & ANGELL

274-9200

DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND Court Reportend Lois Isid Sin

SU :01 A SI NUL SOOS

JOSEPH A. FONTES

Two Exchange Terrace Providence, RI 02903

401-273-0344

Proceeding reported and produced by computer-aided stenography

JUNE 7, 2002 - MORNING SESSION 1 THE COURT: Good morning, everyone. 2 matter before the Court is Civil Action 2000-105 L, the 3 Estate of Yaron Ungar, and others versus the 4 Palestinian Authority and the Palestinian Liberation 5 Organization. The matter is here on defendant's motion 6 to dismiss the complaint. Will the attorneys identify 7 8 themselves for the record please. MR. STRACHMAN: David Strachman for the 9 plaintiffs. 10 MR. SCHILLING: Lawrence Schilling, your 11 Honor, for the defendants. 12 13 MR. SHERMAN: Deming Sherman for the 14 defendants. THE COURT: All right. It's the motion of 15 the defendants. So I'll hear that side first. 16 17 Mr. Schilling. 18 MR. SCHILLING: Thank you, your Honor. Your Honor, Mr. Clark lead counsel is unable to be here. He 19 asked me to express his regrets to you and to send his 20 As your Honor indicated, we have on the table 21 regards. 22 today the defendant's motion to dismiss the amended

alternative, for certification of an interlocutory appeal. We also have pending a motion to assert

complaint which carries with it a request, in the

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defenses under Section 2337-2 of Title 18 which is part of the statute involved here as well as sovereign immunity.

THE COURT: Well, that's an affirmative defense and we haven't reached that stage of the case yet.

MR. SCHILLING: Well, your Honor, I think that 2337 goes either to subject matter jurisdiction, or to legal sufficiency of the claim because the language of the statute begins, "No action shall be maintained..." And in the legislative history that the plaintiffs called to our attention, there is the statement by Mr. Kresco that no cause of action for international terrorism exists against foreign states. So the plaintiffs --

THE COURT: Well, that depends on the facts, the facts as developed. And on a motion to dismiss I only determine the sufficiency of the complaint.

MR. SCHILLING: Well, if it's a question of immunity. If the defendants are correct in their argument that Palestine is a foreign state, I think the application of 2337 becomes pretty clear.

THE COURT: Well, that motion is really not before me, I'm not considering it. I'm only considering the motion to dismiss today.

MR. SCHILLING: I'd also point out, your Honor, as I think we mentioned in one of our motions for a protective order, that --

THE COURT: Well, that's not before me either.

MR. SCHILLING: I understand. But the certification may be unnecessary. If the -- because the denial of an immunity defense -- defense for sovereign immunity is appealable, directly appealable, as an interlocutory order. So I think that that's, you know, an additional wrinkle here. The motion to dismiss asserts in part that the, that the claims of the plaintiffs are nonjusticiable and, basically, the claims are that there's been an inadequate exercise of police power by the Palestinian authority and the PLO. The relationship in failing to prevent the incident that occurred to the Ungars, and in failing to control HAMAS generally.

THE COURT: Well, that all raises factual matters. I can't make factual findings at this point in the litigation. That's going to require discovery, it's going to require the development of the facts.

I'm here only to judge the sufficiency of the complaint on a motion to dismiss.

MR. SCHILLING: Yeah, but you --

THE COURT: You could have answered the case. You could have asserted defenses, and you could have then made a motion for summary judgment at the appropriate time if you thought you had the factual matters not in dispute would result in that disposition. But here, this is a motion to dismiss and it's very limited. And the case that you sent me yesterday from the Seventh Circuit that was just decided a couple of days ago stresses that. And all that's necessary is a short concise statement of the cause of action by the plaintiffs in this case. And if they've stated a cause of action that could be supported by facts, then the complaint survives. Then it's a factual matter.

MR. SCHILLING: Well, I recognize that, your Honor. But the issues that are raised, this complaint, is actually, in order to see its full political effect needs to be seen as related to two other actions that are in the District of Columbia being brought also against the PA, the PLO, and officials.

THE COURT: Well, I'm not concerned with those two actions, I'm concerned with this one and whether a cause of action has been stated.

MR. SCHILLING: Well, the --

THE COURT: I've already ruled that a cause

of action was stated under the Anti-Terrorism Statute.

MR. SCHILLING: Yes, sir, and --

THE COURT: I've already ruled on that.

MR. SCHILLING: -- and we've asked you to reconsider that in the motion, and ask that there be a certification of that matter for an interlocutory appeal as did happen in the Boim Case.

THE COURT: So, your motion really comes down to a discussion of whether there is a cause of action stated in each of the separate counts under Israeli Law. That's what it amounts to. And you're telling me there is no justiciable controversy in that area?

MR. SCHILLING: No, we're saying that when this case is viewed together with the other cases, what's seen here is that there's been an all out attack, largely political, on the PLO and the PA. The actions in D.C. involve an incident -- carefully selected, involve an incident in the GASA Strip, and another incident in East Jerusalem, so that the three cases all together bring in the entire Palestinian Leadership, and the charges against them are very extreme and almost impossible to prove or disprove.

THE COURT: Well, that's the problem.

MR. SCHILLING: But that's what makes --

THE COURT: Theoretically there may be a cause of action here, but then it may be very difficult to prove. But that's something that we'll have to face at some later time.

MR. SCHILLING: Well, except that nonjusticiability often is recognized when there is a lack of judicial standards by which to judge the issues that are being tendered. Now, the extent to which the PA and the PLO should have controlled, if that's the right word, HAMAS, raises all sorts of political considerations including popular support for the PA and the PLO. And, it's, you know, it's something that I think a court will be unable to judge. And that's why we make the argument. I would like to return though, your Honor, to the question of immunity and the effect of Section 2337--

THE COURT: All right.

MR. SCHILLING: -- because I do think that those should be considered at this time. I would point out that on that motion, the plaintiffs opposed granting leave for the Court to consider these matters, but did not reach the merits themselves. They said they'd hold back on it. Now we've raised these matters in the two actions down in the District of Columbia and the answer to these defenses is due in one of these

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cases on June 23. There's also in the District of Columbia, your Honor, a case brought by these plaintiffs against Iran, Ungar versus Iran. It's got some parallels to this case. For example, there's been a motion in that case for the Court to sign a judicial request under the Hague Convention for documents. I believe your Honor has a request of that kind in this case. The request was granted down in D.C. so it really moots the request here. The Court down in D.C., I think observed that the action up here was not called to its attention by the parties. And so far as I know, the case down in D.C. hasn't been called to your attention either. But we learned of it fairly recently. We think that there's no real question that the -- excuse me. That the PA and the PLO meet the definition of estate as it's set forth in the restatement of American Foreign Law. It's an entity that has a defined territory, a permanent population, it's under the control of its own Government, and engages in and has the capacity to engage in formal relations with other Governments. THE COURT: But that requires a development I don't accept those facts. of facts. MR. SCHILLING: Well, --THE COURT: I don't accept those facts as

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I don't have any way of judging them, they'll
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    have to be developed.
                MR. SCHILLING: Well, we would request that
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    they be developed, your Honor, because the question of
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    immunity.
                THE COURT: Well, that has no bearing on a
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    motion to dismiss. We'll develop those after the
    motion to dismiss is denied and this case moves on --
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                MR. SCHILLING: Yeah, but the question --
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                THE COURT: -- and there's discovery.
                MR. SCHILLING: The question of immunity and
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    a question of this sort, as we say, goes -- may well go
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    to subject matter jurisdiction. And, generally
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    speaking, a defense of immunity needs to be disposed of
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    before there is any discovery, except for discovery
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    that may be necessary to determine the issue itself.
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                THE COURT: That's right. That's just what
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    I'm telling you.
                MR. SCHILLING: Yes.
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                THE COURT: That's just what I'm telling
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    you, those facts will have to be developed so that I
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    can make a decision on whether there's sovereign
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    immunity in this case.
                MR. SCHILLING: I guess what I'm reacting to
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is there is a -- there are discovery requests that the

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plaintiff has made that covered the waterfront and I'm
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    I guess
                THE COURT: Well, those will be dealt with
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    later by the Magistrate Judge. Right now, I'm
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    concerned with a motion to dismiss the second
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    complaint. The amended complaint that sets forth a
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    cause of action under the Anti-Terrorism Statute and
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    sets forth three causes of action under Israeli Law
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    pursuant to my prior decision.
                MR. SCHILLING: I guess the point I'm making
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    though, your Honor, is that there should be a -- on a
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    motion to dismiss the Court has the option and
    discretion to make whatever factual inquiries may seem
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     appropriate, and I'm
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                THE COURT: No, I can't. I can't make
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    factual determinations on a motion to dismiss. I have
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    to accept the pleadings as true.
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                MR. SCHILLING: But you have the option to
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    treat it as a motion, say for summary judgment and take
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    into account.
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                THE COURT: Oh, well, if we're going to
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    treat it as a motion for summary judgment we're going
    to have a lot, a lot, of pretrial discovery.
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                MR. SCHILLING: But, what I'm saying --
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                THE COURT: We're going to have a lot of
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discovery and we're not going to try it as a battle of
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    affidavits.
                MR. SCHILLING: What I'm saying, your Honor,
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    is that the effect of Section 2337 should be given
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    priority. And if there's any discovery, -- I'm not sure
    what discovery is necessary because they haven't
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    responded to the arguments. They haven't said why they
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    think that the Palastine Authority is not, is not a
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    foreign state. If it is a foreign state, the
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    application of 2337 seems straightforward. No action
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    shall be maintained against it. And I submit that
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    that's something that needs to be adjudicated first.
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    And if that motion -- if that defense is denied, I'm
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    not sure it's a defense, It may go to subject matter or
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    legal sufficiency. There's an interlocutory appeal as
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    of right. And for that reason I think that it should
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    get priority.
                THE COURT: All right.
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                MR. SCHILLING:
                                Thank you, your Honor.
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                THE COURT: Mr. Strachman.
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                MR. STRACHMAN:
                                Thank you, your Honor.
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    Judge, your Honor, I don't want to repeat what we
    extensively briefed, both parties extensively briefed,
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    but I think what's significant is, as your Honor framed
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    the issue today as to what is before us today.
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A simple, the second motion to dismiss that was filed 1 2 after we filed our amended complaint. As to that motion, and I say this respectfully, virtually nothing . 3 that my brother just mentioned is relevant to that 4 motion. There may be another motion he wants to file, 5 there may be all kinds of issues with discovery and 6 7 other potential cases. It has nothing to do with the issues that they raise in their second motion to 8 dismiss the amended complaint. They raise no issues in 9 that motion as to the sufficiency of the three Israeli 10 causes of action. In fact, they virtually do not 11 mention them in their entire brief. What they do say is 12 that there no justiciable standard. And I would just 13 direct the Court to the Klinghoffer Case when the same 14 issue was raised, the same argument, by same counsel 15 16 without the benefit of our present statute. The Klinghoffers were murdered, I believe, -- Klinghoffer 17 was murdered in 1986. Our statute was enacted in 1991, 18 and then again in '92. There is in that case, the 19 Second Circuit said, "We're faced with an ordinary tort 20 suit." And that's exactly what we have here, a very 21 ordinary tort suit. It has nothing to do with the 22 political movement or political causes, it has to do 23 with a simple murder of a young man and his wife, and 24 whether in fact we can prove the standards that are 25

clearly demarcated in the statute. And we have very 1 2 clear definitional statutes, 2333 and 2339 clearly define what the standards are for this Court to make an 3 inquiry at trial. 4 THE COURT: Now you're talking about the 5 Anti-Terrorism Act? 6 7 MR. STRACHMAN: That's right. THE COURT: You're not talking about the 8 Israeli cause of action? 9 MR. STRACHMAN: That's right. But even in the 10 Israeli cause of action, as we've demonstrated in our 11 brief, those causes of action were basically 12 codification of British and American Common Law. Very 13 simple claims for negligence, et cetera. And my 14 Brother's raise the argument in their brief that there 15 are no standards. The standards are very clear, 16 17 they're crystal clear. They were so clear that 18 Klinghoffer, without the benefit of our present statute, and without a definition of International 19 Terrorism, and without the whole legislative history 20 and whole body of law regarding the terrorism 21 legislation, said that clear and well settled rules of 22 law can easily -- which can easily be relied on can be 23 utilized in that case. All the more so now when we 24 fast forward several years later and have the benefit 25

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of the anti-terrorism legislation. The attempt by the defendants to make this into a political case has -there's just no basis for it. It's a very simple claim, it should be tried in a simple manner. It's no different than numerous other cases that happen to involve people who end up in the newspapers everyday. The mere fact that they're in the newspapers, the mere fact -- and I say that because we've repeatedly had clippings of the New York Times attached to briefs as to where Mr. Arafat is, and whether he can respond on time, et cetera. That has nothing to do with it. Either they are responsible under the law and we can peg them to the categories and definitions of the law or we can't. And I agree with, I think, your Honor's analysis that we need to simply just move this case It's now been 27 months since the complaint was filed. Your Honor wrote a lengthy detailed decision. My brothers now raise on the fourth time they're taking in their motion which is not before us, but which is the motion to for leave to add even new defenses. This is now their fourth response to this court, and they are now asking to raise these new defenses that were explicitly and implicitly waived, and we briefed that very clearly in our response to their motion for leave to amend their second motion.

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They've waived these issues. They can't come back into this court every other week and say they've got a new defense. The law is clear.

THE COURT: Well those defenses -- defenses have to be pleaded. And when an answer is filed, if I deny the motion to dismiss, an answer is filed and they can plead their defenses and then we'll deal with those. Either by motions for summary judgment or whatever other motions.

MR. STRACHMAN: In conclusion, your Honor, I would just like to ask that when your Honor feels it's appropriate, now, or later today, or at another time. I would like the Court to address some matters that have been outstanding. The Hague request that we made, for a Hague letter was filed in July of 2000. It simply requires the Court to sign the letter requesting the documents that we'd like to have from the Israeli Government. They can be transferred here. There's a bureaucracy in Israel. The Justice Ministry would need to get the records, we could share them with my brother and we could get that underway. The discovery motions that we have pending, as my Brother mentioned, discovery was filed in January after we filed our amended complaint. At some point I would request that your Honor allow us to deal with the motions to compel

and also the motions for protective orders that my brother filed. And lastly, Judge, we -- this Court entered default against HAMAS, a co-defendant, in September of 2000. There's some very significant reasons why we'd like to move forward on a damage hearing. We renewed our request, I believe in January for hearing. My brothers did not object and specifically indicated that they were not objecting to us going forward on that. Since, recent events in the last year, the Government -- our Government has confiscated HAMAS assets. We'd like to move forward to obtain judgment against HAMAS. And I would appreciate it if your Honor could consider these issues which have been outstanding for some time. Thank you.

THE COURT: Those are all matters that will be dealt with by the Magistrate Judge after I've ruled on this motion to dismiss.

I'm going to take this matter under advisement and I'm going to write another -- yet another opinion on the subject. I want to point out to you that the Klinghoffer Case was brought under the Death On The High Seas Act, so that there was a statutory basis for that action. Mr. Klinghoffer was thrown off the boat in the Mediterranean and so that was the basis for the action.

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Here, now you have the Anti-Terrorism Statute and
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    the elements that Congress has set forth for proof of a
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    claim, and so you're relying on the Anti-Terrorism
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    Statute. I've already ruled that you've set forth a
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    cause of action under the Anti-Terrorism Statute.
         All right. I'll take this matter under advisement
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    and I'll write an opinion. I'll try to do that as
    expeditiously as possible, but I've got some other
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    matters ahead of it and I'll get to it when I can.
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                MR. STRACHMAN: Thank you, your Honor.
                MR. SCHILLING: Thank you, your Honor.
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                THE COURT: Thank you.
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                THE CLERK: All rise.
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     (R E C E S S)
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CERTIFICATION I hereby certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter. HA. FONTES

LEWE 12, 2002